There Is No Iran Deal on the Table, Escalation Is The Most Likely Scenario
25 March 2026
Is there a real chance of de-escalation through a new Iran deal under current conditions?
The answer suggested here is a sharp no (at 70 % probability, anyway).
What is the likely short-term scenario?
Escalation, triggered by a limited US ground engagement over the weekend of March 28th and 29th, 2026.
Executive Summary
What is presented as diplomacy this week does not align with what the actors can agree on, and the gap is too large to close in its current form. A more consistent reading is that the diplomatic messaging is being used as a stalling technique, in order to buy time, calm the markets and oil prices, while military options are prepared, with the expectation that developments over a short window—quite possibly over a weekend—will address the immediate issue that matters most: control of flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
For full transparency: This was not the starting point of the analysis. The original question of the paper was: What kind of Iran deal is realistically possible once the positions of the main actors are mapped across the key variables that define the problem, what configurations could exist without collapsing under competing demands? Second, if negotiations were to take place, how would a new deal relate to previous arrangements? These questions led to breaking the problem down into a small number of variables—nuclear program, missiles, proxies, sanctions, Hormuz, military posture, regime, and scope—and placing the positions of the main actors next to each other. Once laid out in this way, the picture became much clearer than expected. The areas where agreement is possible are limited and specific, while others are effectively closed, not because they are difficult to negotiate, but because the positions exclude each other by definition. It was at that point that the focus shifted from “what deal could be made” to a more uncomfortable question of whether there is, in fact, a real deal on the table at all.
This paper therefore argues that a comprehensive Iran deal, of the kind currently being hypothesized about, is not realistically achievable. A narrower, modular arrangement—close in form to the JCPOA—remains the only type of deal that could hold together under the positions of the actors involved, but it is equally difficult to see the current US administration accepting such a deal. A workable deal therefore exists only in theory, while in practice the reality is a growing military presence around the Strait of Hormuz and a clear focus on restoring energy flows and stabilising prices. Military preparation is becoming the more decisive reality, with a clear risk that any operation will extend beyond its initial scope.
With the acknowledged risk of sounding too alarmist, let me put it bluntly: If the current path continues, the most likely near-term outcome is not de-escalation through a new deal, but the use of diplomacy as a short holding mechanism while military options are readied around the Strait of Hormuz. A rough reading of the situation would place the chance of a genuine broad deal at perhaps 10–20 percent, the chance that the current signalling is mainly leverage without a clear end-state at roughly 15–20 percent, and the chance that it serves primarily to buy time for a Hormuz-centred operation at around 60–70 percent.
If that last scenario materialises, the danger is not the operation itself, but the high probability that it will not remain limited, and that Iranian retaliation will widen the conflict across energy, shipping, desalination, port, and other critical infrastructure in the Gulf. Under this scenario, Brent oil is likely to surpass 140 USD level, with other energy, fertilizers, and food resources also spiking beyond immediate control.
Only after that comes the longer-term implication. Even if such an operation were to restore some flows in the short run, it would still leave behind a much more damaged system: an Iran that may be weakened but not fundamentally transformed, a United States whose credibility is further eroded, and a global economy forced to absorb higher costs, greater redundancy, more precautionary behaviour, and therefore a deeper drag on productivity and growth. That, in the end, is the broader point of this exercise: markets and much of the public discussion still behave as if this were a manageable episode, while the actual risk profile is far more serious and the long-term economic damage may already be building.
I.
Only a few in the world likely know what the alleged 15-point peace plan contains, and, if it does exist at all, in how coherent of a form, or whether it was formally delivered to the Iranian side. This paper thus only builds on fragments circulating across media and, more importantly, on observable positions and constraints of the actors involved. The starting point was to reduce the whole chaotic and unpredictable situation into a set of variables and to map how the relevant actors position themselves along each of them.
Important note: The selected variables and assigned probabilities are in no way fixed, nor the interpretation definitive. They are based on a reading of currently available information, which is necessarily incomplete and uneven.
Even small changes in assumptions—about capabilities, intent, or sequencing—can shift the picture quite materially. The table is therefore meant as a working document, and it would benefit greatly from being challenged. If there are variables missing, or if some of the weightings or interpretations seem off, I would truly appreciate any challenge or reflection.
Each row isolates one variable—nuclear, missiles, proxies, sanctions, Hormuz, military posture, regime, and scope—and places next to it the observable positions of the main actors, together with a simple reading of how much those positions overlap. The percentages are not measurements in any strict sense, rather a way to express whether there is room for negotiation (higher values), only narrow and conditional space (mid-range values), or no meaningful overlap at all (low or zero values). The pairwise columns (US–Israel, US–Iran, Israel–Iran) capture how aligned or opposed the actors are on a given issue, while the final column translates that into an overall sense of whether an agreement on a particular issue is conceivable under current conditions. The table should therefore be read less as a precise quantification and more as a structured map of where agreement is possible, where it is difficult, and where it breaks down entirely.
On certain dimensions, most notably missiles, the regime change itself, and any attempt at a comprehensive settlement, there is effectively no overlap. These are not areas of difficult negotiation but of structural incompatibility, where the positions of the actors exclude each other by definition. On other dimensions, particularly sanctions and the stability of maritime flows through the Strait of Hormuz, there is a visible degree of alignment, even if partial and conditional. Nuclear issues and proxy activity sit between these poles, in the sense that some overlap can be constructed, but only under significantly narrower formulations than those currently articulated in public discourse.
This distribution constrains the space of possible outcomes quite sharply. A comprehensive agreement that attempts to cover all major domains is not simply unlikely; it is internally inconsistent given the current configuration of positions. What remains feasible is a narrower, modular structure that avoids direct confrontation with the core security architecture of the Iranian regime while still addressing some of the risks that motivate external pressure.
Such a structure would involve capped enrichment combined with intrusive monitoring rather than full dismantling, precisely because dismantlement would be interpreted as incompatible with regime survival. It would leave the missile program outside the agreement, not as a concession but as a recognition of its role as a primary deterrent. Proxy networks would not be eliminated but their most visible and escalatory uses would be reduced. In exchange, sanctions relief would need to be partial, phased, and reversible, and the continued operability of Hormuz would have to be explicitly maintained.
Equally important is the set of demands that such a structure necessarily excludes. Full dismantling of nuclear capacity, elimination of missile forces, termination of proxy networks, regime change, whether explicit or implicit, and attempts to bundle all issues into a single settlement all fall outside the feasible space. These elements are prominent in political rhetoric, but their inclusion removes the overlap required for an agreement to exist at all. In that sense, the gap between what is demanded and what can be jointly sustained becomes the central constraint on diplomacy.
II.
The previous part attempted to define an achievable outcome of negotiations, if or once they should take place: A workable outcome would take the form of a limited, phased agreement that caps enrichment under monitoring, exchanges partial sanctions relief for compliance, maintains open maritime flows, and reduces the most escalatory uses of proxies, while leaving missiles, the regime, and a comprehensive settlement outside its scope. In structural terms, this brings us back close to where we already were under the JCPOA, suggesting that despite everything that has happened since, the space of what can actually hold together has not moved very far.
An important disclaimer is in order here – back then, when JCPOA was being negotiated, I was not sure what to think about the deal, I was not a great supporter of President´s Obama’s approach or of the JCPOA itself. I think I would not have argued for it as a desirable outcome. I am stressing this here so that I preclude unnecessary political comments – I would not count myself among supporters of Barack Obama´s presidency and whatever I am writing here is not meant as a political argument. So, I find striking now is that, once the problem is laid out in structural terms, we seem to be moving back toward a similar configuration anyway, perhaps with Iranian proxy issue playing a more visible role than before.
The following table fixes the achievable outcome outlined above (first column), and places it against different periods (pre-Obama, the JCPOA period, after its withdrawal, pre-war, and now), while keeping the same set of variables throughout. Each cell describes the state of a given variable in that period, and the comparison comes from how far that state is from what the deal would require.
The color scheme: dark green marks close alignment, light green broader compatibility, yellow visible tension, orange a significant gap, and red a direct contradiction. The table therefore does not judge the periods themselves, but shows how compatible each of them is with a deal that could realistically hold together.
What the table shows is that the period around the JCPOA sits closest to the deal structure outlined above, not because it resolved the problem, but because it kept the scope limited and built an exchange around the nuclear file while leaving missiles, proxies, and the regime outside the agreement. Pre-Obama conditions appear relatively close for a different reason, namely that escalation had not yet pushed demands into those non-negotiable areas. Once the agreement was dismantled, that boundary disappears: constraints weaken, trust erodes, and demands expand precisely into the domains that the table already identifies as structurally incompatible. By the pre-war period, this produces a combination of higher Iranian capabilities and very limited space for structured exchange, and the current situation adds a further layer, where some capabilities have been degraded but the scope of demands has widened even more, reaching into missiles, proxies, and, in some formulations, the regime itself.
Read together with the table, this points to a simple constraint. The configuration that remains workable is the one that stays within the narrower set of variables where overlap exists, while attempts to extend the deal into the broader set of demands move it into areas where alignment disappears. In that sense, the JCPOA appears less as a benchmark to return to and more as an example of the only structure that has so far matched what the system could sustain.
III.
What follows from the previous analysis is that the alleged 15-point peace plan, whatever its actual content or status, sits so far outside the achievable deal structure that appears internally consistent. On the one hand, it is possible that the proposal reflects a genuine belief that a maximalist package—touching nuclear, missiles, proxies, and potentially regime-level constraints—can be accepted under pressure; given the lack of overlap across those variables, this would imply a significant misreading of the structural limits outlined earlier. On the other hand, and in my view more consistent with the pattern, the diplomatic layer functions primarily as a pause and a signal to calm the public and the markets, while the United States builds a force posture oriented around the Strait of Hormuz. This is not a claim about intent that can be proven, but a reading of alignment between rhetoric, timing, and material preparation.
If one were to assign rough probabilities to these interpretations, a working estimate might place a genuine expectation of a comprehensive deal in the range of 10–20 percent, a deliberate use of diplomacy as a holding mechanism while preparing a limited military option at 60–70 percent, and the remainder in a middle scenario where the proposal is used mainly as leverage without a clear end-state in mind.
The presence of multiple Marine Expeditionary Units, on the order of several thousand Marines embarked on amphibious ships, provides a flexible force capable of securing ports, islands, or critical nodes along the shipping routes. The preparation of airborne units such as elements of the 82nd Airborne adds a rapid reinforcement layer, suitable for short-notice insertion rather than sustained ground operations. This sits on top of a naval and air structure already designed for control of contested waters: destroyers, mine countermeasure vessels, amphibious ships, and a substantial air component tasked with suppressing drones, small boats, and anti-ship threats. Taken together, this is not a force configured for invasion of Iran, but for reopening and protecting maritime flows under hostile conditions. The scale is sufficient for a focused operation, Hormuz, and/or Kharg islands) and adjacent infrastructure, including scenarios involving mine clearance, escort operations, and limited seizures of key points, while remaining bounded in terms of geography and duration.
The difficulty is that even a bounded operation is unlikely to remain bounded once it meets Iranian retaliation. The earlier tables already showed that proxies, missiles, and regime survival sit outside any negotiable space, and those same variables define how Iran is likely to respond if pushed into a corner. Rather than a contained confrontation at sea, the more likely pattern is a widening of the conflict across the region, with pressure applied through energy infrastructure, desalination plants, ports, and shipping, using a mix of missiles, drones, and proxy networks. A Hormuz-centered operation aimed at restoring flows and stabilizing prices therefore carries an internal tension: it addresses the immediate economic pressure, but at the same time activates precisely those areas that cannot be contained within a deal.
What follows from this is risky to ignore. The achievable deal outlined earlier is narrow and known, and all sides are aware of it, which makes it hard to see the current maximalist proposals as a serious attempt to reach agreement in their present form. It is harder still to expect Donald Trump agreeing to anything resembling Obama´s JCPOA. Set against the ongoing military buildup and the repeated use of signals aimed at calming markets and the American public, a more consistent reading is that diplomacy functions as a holding mechanism while operational options are being prepared around the chokepoint that matters most for prices. This does not require assuming intent beyond what can be observed, but it does suggest that the gap between what is said and what is being prepared is too large to treat at face value.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION
What stands out, when placed next to the developments in the Gulf, is how little of this is reflected in market pricing. Oil should, by any reasonable reading of the physical situation, be trading materially higher, and broader markets should be showing far more stress. We are looking at a concentrated military buildup around a chokepoint through which a significant share of global energy flows, combined with a negotiation space that is narrow and fragile at best, and a clear risk that even a limited operation would spill over into infrastructure, shipping and energy systems across the region. That is not a marginal risk profile, yet markets continue to react mainly to signals of possible talks, as if the underlying configuration could be unwound quickly.
Moreover, this is not just a temporary mispricing of risk, but a sign of a deeper disconnect between financial signals and physical reality. Even in the absence of a full escalation, the system is already adjusting in ways that reduce efficiency: firms hedge supply chains, duplicate logistics, hold inventories, insure against disruption and delay investment decisions. These are not one-off reactions, but cumulative responses that consume capital and labour without increasing output, which is precisely the mechanism through which productivity weakens over time. If the situation in the Gulf continues to evolve along the lines outlined above, then what markets are currently treating as a sequence of manageable shocks is more likely to translate into a persistent drag on economic performance, with higher costs, lower efficiency and a structurally weaker capacity to generate growth.